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Introduction
Freedom of expression in the media has
been problematic in Turkey for almost a cen-
tury. Less than twomonths after the 1923 incep-
tion of the Republic of Turkey, journalists who
opposed the new government were arrested and
brought before an Independence Tribunal.
The 1931 Press Law allowed the Council of Min-
isters to suspend publications and shut down
publishing houses that were considered opposi-
tional to the government. The Press Law and
several similar measures were designed to
promote Turkish nationalism, one of the major
tenets of the new official ideology of Turkey —
Kemalism. (Çatalbas¸, pp. 22–23) This fierce pro-
tection of the Turkish state and government
remains prevalent in Turkish culture and leg-
islation. Furthermore, power circles in Ankara
and the economic interests of media proprietors
have often interfered with journalists’ ability
to freely express their opinions.
Although Turkey signed both the Coun-
cil of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), many of its laws
contradict the treaties’ provisions, even when
taking into account their restrictions. Accord-
ing to Article 10(1) of the ECHR, the right to
freedom of expression includes the “freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas without interference by pub-
lic authority and regardless of frontiers.” Arti-
cle 10(2) of the ECHR states:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibili-
ties, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of
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The author was very dependent on translated source
material for much of the information presented in this
article.
national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disor-
der or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the repu-
tation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the author-
ity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Coun-
cil of Europe)
According to Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, the
right to freedom of expression includes the
“freedom to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice.” Article 19(3) continues:
It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such
as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations
of others; (b) For the protection of national
security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals. (UN Office
of the High . . .)
While some progress has been made in
Turkey in recent years in protecting freedom
of expression (primarily motivated by the desire
to join the European Union (EU)), additional
reforms are still needed. International press
freedom organization Reporters without Bor-
ders ranked Turkey 122nd of 175 countries in
its 2009 press freedom index. ( “RSF 2009
Report . . .”) The ranking was based on hundreds
of journalists’ and media experts’ responses to
a questionnaire that covered topics such as
imprisonment of journalists, access to informa-
tion, censorship, and self-censorship. (“World-
wide Press Freedom . . .”)
In this article, I first address the large role
the media ownership structure plays in media
production. Then, I review various cases and
events in 2009 to highlight the reforms Turkey
needs to make in order to meet Euro-Ameri-
can standards of freedom of expression. Finally,
I present conclusions and recommendations for
the future.
Ownership of the Media
The ownership structure of the media in
Turkey severely restricts freedom of expression.
An oligopolistic market has developed, where
very few people own the majority of the media.
(Barkey) Because cross-ownership (owningmul-
tiple forms of media) is permitted, massive
media conglomerates exist. Publishing is not
a profitable business, so these media owners also
have economic interests in other industries,
ranging from electricity, steel, and construction
to telecommunications, tourism, and trans-
portation. (Baydar) The result is that media
owners use their newspapers and television sta-
tions as tools to further their other economic
interests. The owners directly and indirectly
interfere with daily news and opinion produc-
tion, including and removing content to
advance their other businesses. Journalistic
integrity is sacrificed at the expense of the own-
ers’ economic and political agendas. (Baydar)
Such a restrictive environment in the news-
rooms leads one to question how free Turkish
journalists truly are to express their own ideas.
2009: A Year in Review
Article 301: Insulting Turkey and
Turkish Institutions
Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code
(TPC) makes publicly degrading Turkey, the
Turkish government, or the Turkish military a
punishable offense. A 2008 amendment to the
Article requires the Minister of Justice to
authorize all prosecutions under the Article.
In February 2009 former Minister of Jus-
tice Mehmet Ali S¸ahin permitted prosecutors to
continue their case against Christian mission-
aries Hakan Tas¸tan and Turan Topal under Arti-
cle 301. (“Lawyer Calls Turkish . . .”) S¸ahin’s jus-
tification for his decision came from three men’s
2006 statement that the missionaries called
Islam “primitive and fabricated” and claimed
that Turks who practiced the religion were “bar-
barians.” (Associated Press) There does not
appear to be any indication that the state-
ments (even if made) might create an imminent
risk of harm to the public, which would appro-
priately be subject to limitation under the ECHR
and ICCPR “public order” exceptions.
Throughout the trial, the prosecution had
trouble producing witnesses to support its case.
Several witnesses testified that they did not
even know the defendants. (“Lawyer Calls Turk-
ish . . .”) The prosecution’s final three witnesses
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failed to show up to either the October 2009
or the January 2010 trials, so the court
adjourned and set the next hearing for May
2010. (“Baseless Case against Turkish . . .”) With
almost no evidence, it is unclear to me why
the former Minister of Justice permitted the case
to continue. If the Ministry of Justice is to be
granted sole discretion in judging the legitimacy
of these cases, perhaps a certain quality of evi-
dence (e.g., signed affidavits for such accusa-
tions) should be required in order for him to
authorize prosecution.
The Tas¸tan and Topal case draws atten-
tion to a major issue in Turkey: how to reconcile
freedom of religion with the Kemalist tenet of
secularism. Turkish Republic founder Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk believed that religion was respon-
sible for preventing the modernization of the
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, restriction of pub-
lic religious expression and state control of
religion were seen as necessary to protect
secularism. Historically, when the military has
perceived political parties as threats to secular-
ism, it has tried to remove them from office; as
recently as 1997, the military exerted pressure
on the Refah (Welfare) Party until it resigned.
(United States Commission . . . , p. 203)
One of the most controversial laws is a
ban on wearing Islamic religious headscarves in
government offices and public schools. In Febru-
ary 2008 the 1982 constitution was amended to
lift the ban. However, later in 2008 the Consti-
tutional Court repealed the amendments that
lifted the ban, claiming that the allowance of head-
scarves violated secularism and was thus uncon-
stitutional. (United States Commission . . . ,
p. 204) There has beenmuch debate over whether
this measure is too severe a limit on freedom of
religion.
In 2009 the United States Commission
on International Freedom decided to put Turkey
on its Watch List. The Commission found that
certain policies made it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for non-Muslim communities to
own and maintain houses of worship, to train
religious clergy, and to offer religious education.
(p. 202) The Commission noted that Turkish
nationalists see such communities as a threat
to Turkey’s national identity and integrity. (pp.
206–207) Ta s¸tan and Topal’s trial seems to
confirm this view. I believe that greater efforts
are needed to protect the rights of missionar-
ies and religious minorities, and that the gov-
ernment must try to achieve a greater balance
between religious freedom and secularism.
In 2009 writer Temel Demirer was prose-
cuted under Article 301 for his speech in Ankara
at a protest of the murder of Turkish-Armen-
ian journalist Hrant Dink, who had also been
convicted under the Article. Dink was murdered
in 2007 by a nationalist who claimed that he
shot Dink because he insulted the country. At
the protest, Demirer said:
There is genocide in our history and its
name is the Armenian genocide. Hrant
showed this fact with his own life. I commit
a crime and invite all to do the same. Those
who don’t commit [a] crime against this
killer government will share the guilt of
Dink’s killers. We should commit a crime
in order to prevent what happened to those
Armenians in the past not to happen to
Kurds today. (“Some of the 301 . . .”)
In 2008 former Minister of Justice S¸ahin author-
ized the prosecution to continue, stating, “This
is not a freedom of expression. It exactly falls
[under] a crime of insulting [the] Turkish nation
under the Article 301 of the Turkish Penal
Code.” (“Some of the 301 . . .”) Demirer’s
lawyers appealed to an administrative court to
have S¸ahin’s authorization revoked. The crim-
inal court waited to continue Demirer’s trial
until the administrative court made its decision.
Demirer was facing up to two years imprison-
ment. (Önderog˘lu, “Writer Demirer Awaiting
Court’s . . .”)
S¸ahin’s sentiments reflect Turkey’s contin-
uing concerns over the events of 1915, when
over one million Armenian people were mas-
sacred. The Turkish government refuses to
acknowledge that genocide occurred, and it con-
tinues to prosecute those who adopt this view.
In addition to Dink and Demirer, Nobel laure-
ate Orhan Pamuk was prosecuted under Arti-
cle 301 for saying that “30,000 Kurds and one
million Armenians were killed on this soil.”
Although S¸ahin did not authorize this prose-
cution and the criminal case was later dropped,
Pamuk still faces compensation claims; six
plaintiffs insisted that his statement attacked
their personal value of the nation. (Önderog˘lu,
“Supreme Court Allows . . .”) Again, Turkey’s
fierce protection of nationalism has come into
conflict with people’s freedom of expression.
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According to the third section of Article
301, “The expression of an opinion for the
purpose of criticism does not constitute an
offence.” (European Union, 2008, p. 15) Because
Demirer’s speech and other people’s com-
ments about the events of 1915 are expres-
sions of opinion, they would not seem to violate
the Article. Furthermore, S¸ahin already seems
to have found Demirer guilty, with his public
statement “I won’t let anyone call my state a
murderer.” (Demirer, as quoted in Altintas¸)
According to critic Erol Önderog˘lu, S¸ahin’s
statement breaches both Article 277, by “influ-
encing those performing a judicial duty,” and
Article 288, which prohibits interference with
the judicial process. (Önderog˘lu, as quoted in
Altintas¸) I think that public figures, such as
the Minister of Justice, should be more selective
in what they say in public, so as to keep the judi-
cial process impartial.
In its 2009 Progress Report on Turkey’s
efforts to meet the criteria for acceptance into
the EU, the European Commission determined
that the 2008 amendments to Article 301 signif-
icantly reduced the number of prosecutions of
Article violations that restrict freedom of expres-
sion. Of the cases that were already in progress
at the time the amendments were promulgated,
the Ministry of Justice only allowed eight per-
cent to continue. Of the prosecutions that
were initiated after the amendments were prom-
ulgated, the Ministry of Justice allowed three
percent to continue. The Commission seemed
to think that these improvements were suffi-
cient. (European Union, 2009, p. 17)
Offenses against Public Order
Article 215: Praise of Crimes and
Offenders
In 2008 an investigation was launched
against the newspaper Demokrat I˙skenderun for
publishing a press release in which a district
chair of the Democratic Society Party, Mahu-
mut Aydıncı, labeled imprisoned Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan as
“respectable.” Both Aydıncı and editor-in-chief
Ersen Korkmaz were accused of violating Arti-
cle 215, which prohibits praise of crimes and
criminals. (“Investigation Launched against
Calling . . .”) The trial continued throughout
2009. In 2010 Aydıncı was fined TL 1,500 for the
violation, while Korkmaz was acquitted.
(Önderog˘lu, “DTP Member Sentenced . . .”) Sim-
ilarly, in 2009 bookstore owner Seferi Yılmaz
was convicted of violating Article 215 and was
sentenced to a year in prison for referring to
Öcalan as the “Kurdish people’s hero.”
(Önderog˘lu, “Semdinli Victim Faces . . .”)
In 2009 writer Temel Demirer was sen-
tenced to five months2 in prison for violating
Article 215 in a speech he made at a culture fes-
tival. In his speech he discussed his respect
for a member of the Maoist Communist Party
(MKP). According to the police report, 74 parts
of the three-page speech could not be deci-
phered, i.e., the transcriber could not under-
stand several parts of the speech. (Önderog˘lu,
“BI˙A’s Second Quarterly . . .”) It is curious
why a court would accept such a document as
sufficient evidence to convict someone.
Article 215 directly violates international
standards of freedom of expression. First, the
Article is aimed squarely at expression of ideas
and is not limited in any way to the aforemen-
tioned exceptions of the ECHR or the ICCPR.
Secondly, the Article seems to assume judicial
infallibility, because once the courts decide that
someone is a criminal, it effectively becomes
illegal to protest the conviction. Someone
claiming that a convict was wrongly convicted
could be prosecuted under Article 215 for prais-
ing the alleged criminal. Preventing people from
expressing positive opinions about criminals
is simply antithetical to freedom of expression
because it proscribes nothing more than expres-
sion.
Article 216: Inciting Hatred or
Denigration
Article 216 prohibits the incitement of
hatred or denigration. In 2009 Turkish-French
writer Nedim Gürsel was prosecuted for vio-
lating Article 216 in his novel Daughters of
Allah, which recounts the beginning of Islam.
After a citizen accused the book of using inap-
propriate language against the Prophet Muham-
mad, his wives, and the Koran (Arsu), an official
committee for religious affairs reported that the
book was beyond the scope of freedom of expres-
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Some reports say six months.
sion. (“‘Daughters of Allah’. . .”) Gürsel faced
imprisonment if convicted, but he was acquit-
ted in June 2009. The courts determined that
because the novel is set in the past, it did not
immediately threaten public order or incite vio-
lence. (“Author Nedim Gürsel . . .”)
In 2009 Kuzey Publications owner Erol
Karaaslan was prosecuted under Article 216 for
publishing a Turkish translation of Richard
Dawkins’ The God Delusion. This was Karaaslan’s
second trial under the Article for the book; he was
acquitted in a 2008 trial. The book was accused
of insulting Judaism, Allah, and the prophets.
Karaaslan faced amaximum of four years impris-
onment (Önderog˘lu, “Istanbul Prosecutor: ‘Drop
. . .”), but was acquitted in July 2009. (Ög˘) The
case seems to be in direct violation of Article
14(7) of the ICCPR, which states:
No one should be liable to be tried or pun-
ished again for an offence for which he has
already been finally convicted or acquitted
in accordance with the law and penal
procedure of each country. (Council of
Europe)
Although the courts succeeded in protect-
ing Gürsel and Karaaslan, I find it problematic
that both were brought to court in the first
place. First, prosecution for writing a ficti-
tious work that occurred several centuries ago
(and therefore which cannot be seen as directly
inciting violence) seems to directly restrict free
expression. Furthermore, insulting or criticiz-
ing another’s religion should not be grounds for
prosecution (unless done in a circumstance that
presents a clear and present danger of imme-
diate violence), for it inherently restricts free-
dom of expression. As with Tas¸tan and Topal, the
aforementioned Christian missionaries, Turkish
prosecutors seem to be far too sensitive to
religious issues as a result of their determina-
tion to protect Turkish secularism. In the 2009
Progress Report, the European Commission
referred to the public order articles as restrict-




Despite the 2008 Progress Report’s specific
reference to the Turkish court decisions to
ban the file-sharing website YouTube, the fourth
court order in two years to block access to the
website was issued in November 2008. The court
determined that certain content on the site was
disrespectful towards Atatürk. (“Turkey: Another
Blocking . . .”) Article 8 of Law 5651 on the Pre-
vention of Crimes in the Computer Domain
allows courts and the telecommunications
authority (T I˙B) to block websites “when there
is sufficient evidence of the improper aspect of
content.” (“Bill Censoring Online . . .”) The law’s
definition of improper content includes viola-
tions of Law No. 5816, a 1951 law that prohibits
insults to the memory of Atatürk. (“RSF 2009
Report . . .”)
Several public figures, both in Turkey
and abroad, have expressed opposition to the
ban. In 2008 Richard Howitt, vice president of
the European Parliament’s Human Rights Sub-
Committee, met in Ankara with Minister of Jus-
tice S¸ahin to try to convince him to lift the web-
site ban for the sake of freedom of speech.
Howitt claimed that Turkey is “putting itself
in the same bracket as some of the world’s
pariah states” and warned that failure to lift the
bans would be detrimental to Turkey’s bid for
EU accession. (“Turkey: Another Blocking . . .”)
Additionally, Turkish President Abdullah Gül of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) pub-
licly announced that he did not want Turkey
to be one of the countries to ban the site. Other
senior party members also claimed to disap-
prove of the ban, insisting that it was embar-
rassing to Turkey. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment did not make any effort to overturn the
ban. (Berlinski)
Professor Mustafa Akgül of Bilkent Univer-
sity and website manager Füsun Sarp Nebil have
suggested that the ban unfairly punishes users
who publish or watch the rest of the content on
YouTube. Akgül has noted that, although there
are almost 40,000 videos about Atatürk on the
site, there are also over 100,000 videos about
Istanbul. Similarly, Nebil has equated the
YouTube ban to “burning the entire library
because of one book.” (Nebil, as quoted in
Maden) In my own opinion, it is impossible to
see how Law 5816 can even be fit within the
ECHR and ICCPR exceptions to freedom of
expression.
The YouTube ban does not appear to be
particularly effective; even Prime Minister Recep
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Tayyip Erdog˘an has admitted that he still uses
YouTube and has stated that others can, as well.
(Berlinski) According to Alexa Internet, which
ranks websites according to a combination of
their average daily visitors and page views,
YouTube is the fifth most popular website in
Turkey. (“Top Sites in Turkey”) Because so many
users have figured out how to use proxy servers
to access the site, there has been little protest
from the general public against the ban. In addi-
tion to indifference about the issue, people may
be afraid of appearing to support content that
allegedly insults Atatürk. For these reasons, the
ban was not addressed during municipal elec-
tions in April 2009. (Berlinski) I find this unfor-
tunate because, while many have circumvented
the ban, it is difficult to say how many more
were denied access to this source of information
because they did not know how to violate the
ban or were afraid to violate it.
Bloggers have been the most active pro-
testers of the ban. Blogger group SansureSansur
has designed online banners in attempts to raise
awareness about the ban. Selim Yoruk, the
founder of the organization, is frustrated that
Turkish people seem to think there is no issue
because they can still access the website, but he
believes that censorship of the Internet and
the media should still gain attention. In one
protest, a few hundred Turkish bloggers posted
the message “This site is blocked because the
author himself chose to do it” on their websites.
(Berlinski)
Other Websites
According to the official TI˙B statistics, in
May 2009 some 2,601 websites were blocked
in Turkey under Law No. 5651. Courts also
blocked 197 other websites for reasons other
than Law No. 5651 provisions, but the TI˙B did
not provide further information about these
court decisions. After May, the TI˙B decided to
no longer publish the blocking statistics, a
discouraging decision in and of itself since
transparency is at the heart of a democratic
state. (“At Least 6000 Websites . . .”)
As of January 2010, approximately 3,700
websites were estimated to be banned by Turk-
ish authorities. (Heinrich) Over 60 websites
including a Turkish dictionary, that of a teach-
ers’ trade union, and a website by British biol-
ogist Richard Dawkins were blocked after reli-
gious leader and creationist Adnan Oktar
filed lawsuits against them. (“Turkey: Another
Blocking . . .”) Other blocked websites have
included video-sharing website DailyMotion,
social networking site MySpace, blogging tool
WordPress, web-hosting service GeoCities,
Google Groups, the Vatan newspaper website,
and blog-storage-service website Blogger.
(Önderog˘lu, “BI˙A’s Media Monitoring . . .”)
The lack of transparency in censorship
procedures makes it extremely difficult for web-
site owners to appeal court decisions. For
instance, the blocking notices do not include
the courts’ justification for their decisions,
and it is difficult for the owners to obtain access
to the rulings. Therefore, website owners can-
not prepare informed cases for their appeals.
The T I˙B’s decision to not publish its official
blocking statistics after May 2009 further
decreased transparency. Unsurprisingly, the
European Commission was still concerned
about the high volume of website bans in its
2009 report. (European Union, 2009, p. 18)
Ankara Power Circles: The Dog˘an
Tax Cases
In 2009 there were two tax cases against
Dog˘an Media Group (DMG), the largest media
company in Turkey. In February the conglom-
erate was fined $500 million by the Finance
Ministry. In September the revenue authority
imposed a fine of $2.5 billion (“Dog˘an Notified
of . . .”), an amount close to the company’s net
worth. (“A Clear Assault . . .”) According to a
statement filed with the Istanbul Stock
Exchange, back taxes comprised 39 percent of
the fine, penalties comprised 43.5 percent,
and interest comprised 17.5 percent. The taxes
were on share transfers between DMG compa-
nies; DMG argues that such transfers are tax-
exempt. (“Dog˘an Notified of . . .”)
The fines, which could potentially put
the company out of business, have been seen
as restrictions of press freedom, particularly
because the media group is known to oppose the
government regime in power at the time the
taxes were levied. (“A Clear Assault . . .”) Sen-
ior politicians have also encouraged Turks to
boycott media outlets owned by the Dog˘an con-
glomerate, further suggesting that the gov-
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ernment was creating a hostile environment for
an independent press. (European Union, 2009,
p. 18)
In an interview with theWall Street Jour-
nal in October 2009, Prime Minister Erdog˘an
said, “In the U.S., too, there are people who have
had problems with evading taxes. Al Capone
comes to mind.” (Champion) By comparing
Dog˘an with Capone, the infamous gangster who
was convicted of tax evasion, Erdog˘an implied




The European Commission’s 2009
Progress Report applauded President Gül for
contributing “to a positive atmosphere as
regards the Kurdish issue,” referring to the
treatment of the Kurdish minority. It also
pointed out that improvements have been made
in recent years, as the issue is now openly
debated in the media. (European Union, 2009,
pp. 8, 18) However, Kurdish journalists are
still being unfairly targeted and prosecuted in
Turkey.
In 2009 the courts suspended Kurdish
newspapers Günlük and Özgür under Anti-
Terror Law. Article 7 prohibits propaganda
that supports the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist
group. Members of Günlük’s staff, including the
owner, editors, and a columnist, were also pros-
ecuted and faced imprisonment for publishing
articles and photos of the organization. (“Gov-
ernment Urged to Include . . .”)
Vedat Kurs¸un, former editor-in-chief of
the Kurdish newspaper Azadiya Welat, was
detained from January 2009 until February
2010 for publishing articles about the PKK.
The journalist faced 105 charges of publishing
PKK propaganda and of being a member of the
PKK, and he faced 525 years imprisonment. In
February 2010 Kurs¸un’s successor, Ozan Kil-
inc, was sentenced to over 21 years in prison
for violating the Anti-Terror Law by publish-
ing articles on the PKK in twelve issues of
Azadiya Welat. (Önderog˘lu, “Kurdish Journal-
ist Faces . . .”) Despite the European Union’s
assessment, I believe that social reforms are
necessary to provide equal treatment to Kur-
dish journalists.
Outlook for the Future: Conclusions
and Recommendations
From October 2008 until September 2009,
11 percent of the applications to the European
Court of Human Rights against Turkey were
about freedom of expression. Turkey contin-
ues to make some progress, as a large number
of sensitive topics have been discussed in Turk-
ish media. However, the legal system is still in
need of significant reform. The number of pros-
ecutions and convictions due to broad interpre-
tations of unnecessary laws is too high to ignore.
Legislation, political pressures on the media,
and legal uncertainty continue to restrict free-
dom of the press and expression to an unaccept-
able degree, as various laws seem to conflict
with the standards set by the ECHR and ICCPR.
(European Union, 2009, pp. 14, 19)
The European Commission found the
2008 amendments to Article 301 to be sufficient
because the Minister of Justice denied permis-
sion to continue prosecution for so many cases.
However, the amendments do not seem to
have had an effect on the prosecutors, whose
requests to file lawsuits under the article have
not diminished. They continue to indict those
who criticize public figures and institutions or
historical events. Although former Minister of
Justice S¸ahin and Minister of Justice Sadullah
Ergin have denied a large number of requests
to authorize prosecution since the amendments
were passed, as long as the Article still exists
future ministers may decide to grant permission
to prosecute still more cases. (“ARTICLE 19
Concerned . . .”) The Article’s very presence in
the TPC is enough to have a chilling effect on
statements that might be seen as violations.
Moreover, Article 301’s vague and often
contradictory wording is too difficult for courts
to interpret consistently. In a 2002 European
Court of Human Rights case, the Court ruled
that a Polish law violated Article 10 of the ECHR
because it “was not formulated with sufficient
precision to enable the applicant to regulate his
conduct.” (Gawe˛da v. Poland, no. 26229/95)
Because Article 301 does not distinguish
between a comment that “degrades” Turkey and
one that merely “criticizes” it, the Article also
seems to be in violation of Article 10 of the
ECHR. Unless the courts adopt a standard for
the Article that only statements that are prov-
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ably false can degrade Turkey or its institutions,
any distinction will necessarily have an unac-
ceptable subjective element to it.
Law 5816 (prohibiting insults to Atatürk),
Article 301 (prohibiting insults to Turkey and
Turkish institutions), and Article 215 (prohibit-
ing praise of crimes and criminals) seem to vio-
late international law, as they fail to meet the
criteria for exceptions to freedom of expres-
sion laid out in the ECHR and the ICCPR. The
Articles are not necessary for a democratic soci-
ety; nor do they protect the rights of others,
national security, or public order. They there-
fore must be amended or abolished in order
for Turkey to truly guarantee freedom of expres-
sion.
Article 216 is also problematic. The Islamic
religious authority claimed that “[Daughters of
Allah] uses insulting, disrespectful and offen-
sive language against God, prophets, divine reli-
gions, principles of religion, religious books and
prayers. This cannot be seen [to be] in the scope
of freedom of thought or criticism.” (Hamza
Aktan, as quoted in Dis¸li) However, neither
the ECHR nor the ICCPR allows for excep-
tions on the basis of insults to religion. There-
fore, such claims should not be considered by
the courts. Either amendments to Article 216
or changes in the application of the law are nec-
essary to avoid prosecution for criticisms of reli-
gion; such prosecution would necessarily frus-
trate free discourse about religious topics.
Website bans are another serious restric-
tion on free speech in Turkey. Such policies
limit citizens’ right to freedom of expression by
discouraging them from posting potentially
controversial material, and such policies also
limit the right of the citizenry to access oppos-
ing points of view. The nontransparent cen-
sorship procedures also raise doubts about the
quality and accountability of the rulemaking
process. Internet laws should be revised to
ensure that only harmful content, such as child
pornography or truly dangerous content (e.g.,
instructions for assembling a bomb), be blocked.
Additionally, Turkish prosecutors and
courts must stop discriminating against Kur-
dish newspapers and journalists. The newspa-
per bans and prosecutions against journalists
for merely discussing the activities of the PKK
are clear violations of freedom of expression.
Repression of Kurdish thought should no longer
be tolerated in Turkey.
Turkey must also make significant legisla-
tive reforms in order to meet the international
standards of freedom of expression to eventu-
ally be considered for accession to the EU. Judi-
cial reforms are also necessary, for consistent
applications of the laws are essential to pro-
tect journalists. Furthermore, separation of
media conglomerates’ personal interests from
the news they produce is important to pro-
mote free expression of opinions and news.
Finally, the country is in need of an attitu-
dinal shift in the government. Imposing a fine
large enough to put a media company out of
business undermines freedom of expression.
Power circles in Ankara must recognize that
freedom to criticize the government is a nec-
essary component of democracy.
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